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 “TRESPASS” TO MOVABLES? SAY NO MORE. 
MCI COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC. V. HAGAN 
AND LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 2315 
Bill Hudson* 
Answering a certified question from the U.S. Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently refused to 
recognize the tort of trespass to chattels, declaring instead that the 
claim at issue was governed by the general delictual liability 
provision of Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. 
I. BACKGROUND 
MCI Communications maintained claims of trespass and 
negligence against co-defendants Hagan and Joubert in federal 
court.1 The suit arose after an MCI fiber optic cable, a portion of 
which ran underground Hagan’s property, was cut, allegedly by 
Joubert while operating a backhoe on Hagan’s land.2 At trial, MCI 
attempted to demonstrate the defendants’ negligence by claiming 
noncompliance with the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act.3  
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 1. Verizon Business Global initially brought the action, and MCI was 
substituted when its ownership of the damaged movable was established. MCI 
Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan, 641 F. 3d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 2. MCI Communications Service, 641 F. 3d at 114. 
 3. MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan, 74 So. 3d 1148, 1149, 
1151 (La. 10/25/11). The Louisiana Underground Utilities and Facilities 
Damage Prevention Law, or “Damage Prevention Act” as used by the court, LA. 
REV. STAT. § 49:1749.11 et seq., provides among other things that “no person 
shall excavate… near the location of an underground facility or utility… without 
having first ascertained, in the manner prescribed in Subsection B of this 
Section, the specific location as provided in R.S. 40:1749.14(D) of all 
underground facilities or utilities in the area which would be affected by the 
proposed excavation or demolition.” LA. REV. STAT. § 49:1749.13(A).  




The trial court found that MCI had only a contractual right for 
its cable to run through Hagan’s property according to the sale 
terms when Hagan purchased the land, and not a servitude. A jury 
found the co-defendants had not acted negligently.4 Based on these 
findings, the trial judge declined, over MCI’s objection, to instruct 
the jury, in essence: “A Defendant may be held liable for an 
inadvertent trespass resulting from an intentional act.”5 
 Reviewing the case on MCI’s appeal, the U.S. Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reasoned that, without a servitude in MCI’s 
favor, no trespass to land could have occurred. Although, finding 
enough evidence to establish Joubert had severed the cable while 
intentionally operating the backhoe, the Fifth Circuit believed 
“MCI may [have been] entitled to have the jury instructed on the 
claim of trespass to chattels.”6 Having been presented with no 
Louisiana Supreme Court decision on the requisite intent for 
“trespass to chattels” (or in regard to the very existence of that tort 
in Louisiana),7 the Court of Appeals certified to the State Supreme 
Court the question: 
Is the proposed jury instruction in this case, which states 
that “[a] Defendant may be held liable for an inadvertent 
trespass resulting from an intentional act,” a correct 
statement of Louisiana law when the trespass at issue is the 
severing of an underground cable located on property 
owned by one of the alleged trespassors [sic], and the 
property is not subject to a servitude by the owners of the 
underground cable but only to the contractual right to keep 




                                                                                                             
 4. MCI Communications Services, 74 So. 3d at 1151. 
 5. Id. 
 6. MCI Communications Services, 641 F. 3d at 115. 
 7. MCI Communications Services, 74 So. 3d at 1152. 
 8. MCI Communications Services, 641 F. 3d at 116. 




II. LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT DECISION  
 To reply to the Fifth Circuit, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
framed the issue as “whether Louisiana law recognizes a distinct 
tort of ‘trespass to chattels’ and, if so, can a ‘trespass to chattels’ 
be committed inadvertently if it results from an otherwise 
intentional act.”9 The court first noted an important distinction 
between trespass to chattels and the facts of the Hagan case: 
relying on Black’s Law Dictionary, legal scholars, and The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts,10 the court concluded that “the 
common law claim of trespass to chattels appears to require intent 
to interfere with another’s interest in movable property before an 
action for trespass to chattels may lie.”11 
The court then concluded that, regardless of the presence or 
absence of intent, an owner of movable property damaged by 
another “has an adequate remedy under the law of tort without 
recourse to the common law trespass to chattels” under the 
broadly-phrased Louisiana Civil Code article 2315(A)—“[e]very 
act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by 
whose fault it happened to repair it.”12 A remedy under article 
2315 does not preclude evidence of a defendant’s noncompliance 
with the Damage Prevention Act, since, even though “a violation 
of the statute does not result in either strict civil liability or 
negligence per se,” ignoring the duty to locate “an underground 
utility as required by statute subjects the excavator to delictual 
liability under the theory of negligence, and any statutory violation 
is considered in the traditional duty-risk analysis.”13 MCI’s 
proposed jury instruction was thus “not a correct statement of 
Louisiana law.”14  
                                                                                                             
 9. Id. at 1153. 
 10. Id. at 1153-1154 & n.8-10. 
 11. Id. at 1154. 
 12. Id. at 1155 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315(A)). 
 13. Id. at 1155. 
 14. Id. 





 Hagan is a key illustration of the basic difference in how 
the common law and the civil law remedy damages. The decision 
underlines, and will doubtlessly help to preserve, Louisiana’s civil 
law tradition.  
The question certified by the Fifth Circuit appears to have 
resulted from MCI’s ignoring Louisiana’s encompassing codal 
framework for remedying damages, and needlessly pinning its case 
to a “trespass” theory. Presented with the issue of trespass, the 
Fifth Circuit wondered whether a certain type of trespass theory—
trespass to chattels—was applicable to the claim.  
At common law, a claim for damage to movable property 
would involve a more particularized claim centered on one or more 
specific theories of recovery, since common law tort suits, 
traceable to old writs,15 are maintained under theories of recovery 
connected to specific sets of facts.16 The task of fitting the right 
theory with its corresponding elements to an injury-causing 
occurrence can become highly technical: regarding cases of 
damage to buried utility lines, Prosser and Keeton note that the 
intent element alone produces contention in the fact-specific 
inquiries surrounding trespass to chattels claims.17 By contrast, 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 gives legal effect to a general 
principle, as is characteristic of codal law,18 that there may be a 
remedy for any act which causes damage, thus removing the 
                                                                                                             
 15. 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES: THE LAW OF 
TORTS 127, 162 (2d ed. 2011) (brief background of writs for trespasses to land 
and personal property). 
 16. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 211 (2000); 
(Common law “could not, and did not, subsequently modernize itself, in terms 
of overall expression…. [T]here is still a law of torts (the plural is important) 
since there were no general principles of liability in England, only given 
wrongs…”) Id. at 217. 
 17. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 86 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
 18. GLENN, supra note 16 at 126; see generally, Alain Levasseur, On the 
Structure of a Civil Code, 44 TUL. L. REV. 693 (1970). 




complexity of defining and recognizing specific torts claim-by-
claim and fact-by-fact.  
 In Hagan, the State Supreme Court applied article 2315 
literally, in accordance with the Code’s rule of interpretation: 
“When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not 
lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written 
and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of 
the legislature.”19 The court recognized article 2315’s capacity to 
remedy damage, and it prevented the adoption of a common law 
theory which, given its historical application, could have become 
the basis for tort liability for trespass alone, even when trespass 
does not produce damages.20 
 In his treatise on Louisiana tort law, Professor William E. 
Crawford states, “The fact of trespass in itself is not an actionable 
civil wrong, contrary to the common law. All actions for trespass 
under Louisiana law have involved damage done by the trespasser 
after or in the course of the trespass.”21 Indeed, under the 
reasoning of cases like Dickie's Sportsman's Centers, Inc. v. 
Department of Transp. & Dev., an action in trespass without 
damages would be absurd in Louisiana:  
In the assessment of damages arising out of trespass, the 
trial court has much discretion. The damage, however, must 
be certain, and the discretion exercised only to the extent of 
the damage and ascertained from all the facts and 
circumstances.22 
 
Without damage, there can be no recovery; therefore, there is 
no “tort” in the sense of “[a] civil wrong, other than breach of 
contract, for which a remedy may be obtained.”23 The simple 
                                                                                                             
 19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9. 
 20. KEETON ET AL., supra note 17 at 67. 
 21. WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT 
LAW 242 (2d ed. 2009). 
 22. Dickie's Sportsman's Centers, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 477 So. 
2d 744, 751 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 1985) (citations in original omitted). 
 23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1626 (9th ed. 2009). 




solution in Hagan is a consistent application of these concepts: a 
claim for trespass to movable property cannot stand alone and 
apart from a claim for damages; thus Civil Code article 2315 
governs actions where there is damage resulting from trespass. 
  Trespass as recognized in Louisiana appears to be a tort 
almost completely anticipated by the broad wording of article 
2315. It would seem that filing a suit “for trespass” should be 
effectively unnecessary in Louisiana, since a “suit for damages 
pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2315” would likely be a more 
accurate description. Even trespass accompanied by the conversion 
of trees on another’s property, the distinctive instance where 
interference with private property gives rise to enhanced damages 
in Louisiana, is governed by statute, and not fact-specific common 
law theory.24 Where trespass is concerned, the language of the 
Civil Code, while broad, does not seem to need court-created 
factors “borrowed from the common law of torts” to substantially 
clarify how liability is to be proven, as opposed to concepts like 
“assault, battery, false imprisonment…[, and] negligence,” in 
regards to which the common law has been readily enlisted to 
define essential elements.25 Rather, a plaintiff in a trespass action 
succeeds by proving what the Code plainly and simply requires: 
damage caused by another’s act.  
 Yet how valuable is Hagan in “predict[ing] the path of 
Louisiana tort law”26 generally, or the direction of state law in its 
entirety? The opinion seems at first glance a sweeping defense of 
civilian methodology, insisting on reliance upon the Civil Code’s 
language despite a common law theory which might more closely 
fit the facts alleged, and reconciling a claim for damages to 
                                                                                                             
 24. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:4278.1; CRAWFORD, supra note 21. 
 25. Harriet Spiller Dagget et al., A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the 
Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12, 32 (1937). See also, CRAWFORD, 
supra note 21, at 22 (“The codal texts governing délit are so spare and general 
that the court must as a practical matter write most of the tort law with its own 
pen, though it is done in the name of interpretation.”).  
 26. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 24. 




movable property with statutory text. But the Louisiana trespass 
claim might be rather unique even in Louisiana tort law for the 
ease with which it can be understood and maintained. Proving 
liability for other delicts in the state appears to require more 
attention to the factors of specific wrongs, as evidenced by the 
importation of common law elements to define many other torts.27  
Another indication of plain application of statutory language 
being a less-than-universal principle is the wide discretion 
exercised by Louisiana appellate courts in tort cases. Prof. 
Crawford has identified forty-five key cases spanning twenty-four 
years which represent the state judiciary’s independent 
modifications of rules on such matters as strict liability, 
prescription, and damages for mental and emotional suffering.28 
The old notion that “[t]here is no liability in this State for damages 
sounding in tort except where such liability is expressly or 
impliedly authorized by the codal articles and statutes of the 
state”29 seems unlikely to remain absolute when one reads a long 
list of Louisiana appellate decisions illustrating “[l]iberalization of 
tort liability by the Louisiana appellate courts.”30  
 In Louisiana jurisprudence on other matters of law as well, 
strict adherence to civil law principles has counterparts. While one 
can identify close adherence to elementary civil law principles in a 
number of court opinions,31 there are others in which common law 
doctrine seems about to summarily supplant existing statutory 
principles. For instance, in the 2004 Louisiana Supreme Court 
decision in Avenal v. State, the majority32 and concurring33 
                                                                                                             
 27. Dagget et al., supra note 25. 
 28. Id. at 25-30. 
 29. Martin v. Brown, 240 La. 674, 680 (La. 1960). 
 30. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 25. 
 31. See e.g., State ex rel. D.W., 865 So. 2d 45, 46 (La. 2004) (on statutory 
construction); Gregor v. Argenot Great Cent. Ins. Co., 851 So. 2d 959, 964 n.6 
(La. 2003) ("Legislation is superior to any other source of law and is a solemn 
expression of legislative will."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sewerage & 
Water Bd., 710 So. 2d 290, 292 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998) (on sources of law). 
 32. Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1101-1102, 1108 n.28 (La. 2004); 
John J. Costonis, Avenal v. State: Takings and Damagings in Louisiana, 65 LA. 




opinions suggested a common law public trust doctrine could be 
applied in Louisiana, despite scholars’ conclusions that Louisiana’s 
constitution and legislation might well serve the purposes met by 
the public trust doctrine in other states.34 
 However, despite any drifting away from the pure civil law 
caused by Louisiana judicial decisions,35 the delict akin to trespass 
to chattels as concerned in Hagan seems particularly suited for 
straightforward application of the Civil Code’s language, and thus 
is unlikely to be complicated by judicial gloss in the future. 
“Trespass” claims like that brought by MCI are suits for either 
unauthorized intrusion upon another’s property, or damage to 
another’s property.36 Louisiana law does not remedy mere 
unauthorized intrusions if no damage has resulted, and plainly 
allows recovery when there is injury caused by another. Refusing 
to recognize a specific action for trespass to chattels, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court refused to complicate the plain meaning of article 
2315 and the requirements for maintaining a suit for delictual 
damages, and declined to expand unnecessarily state law through 
jurisprudence. The court followed its charge from the legislature 
                                                                                                             
 
L. REV. 1015, 1030 (2005) (“Justice Victory… announced… the public trust-
based doctrine acknowledging the ‘right of the state to disperse fresh water… 
over saltwater marshes in order to prevent coastal erosion.’”). 
 33. Avenal, 886 So. 2d 1085, at 1115 n.8 (Weimer, J., concurring). 
 34. Lee Hargrave, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Plea for Precision, 53 LA. 
L. REV. 1535, 1541-1544 (1993); A. N. Yiannopoulos, Five Babes Lost in the 
Tide—A Saga of Land Titles in Two States: Philips Petroleum Co. v. 
Mississippi, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1357, 1370 (1988).  
 35. The ultimate question, likely, is whether Louisiana courts have 
sometimes looked completely beyond statutory law and proceeded according to 
a kind of common law, or have acted within their authority under Civil Code 
article 4: “When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from legislation 
or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To decide 
equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.” This issue 
cannot be fully examined here. However, the breadth of article 2315 in 
sanctioning remedies for all damage-causing acts, as well as the public trust-like 
statutory law of Louisiana, see e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 450-452, 455-456; 
Hargrave, supra note 34, call into question the necessity of judicially-created 
rules in cases to which this legislation would seem to apply. 
 36. MCI Communications Services, 74 So. 3d 1151. 




most exactly, applied what the Code clearly provides, and was 
thereby true to the law, in principle and in letter. 
